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Abstract: In seeking to explain aspects of real-world economies that defy easy understanding when analysed via conven-
tional means, Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller has since 2017 introduced and developed the idea of Narrative
Economics, where observable economic factors such as the dynamics of prices in asset markets are explained
largely as a consequence of the narratives (i.e., the stories) heard, told, and believed by participants in those
markets. Shiller argues that otherwise irrational and difficult-to-explain behaviors, such as investors partici-
pating in highly volatile cryptocurrency markets, are best explained and understood in narrative terms: people
invest because they believe, because they have a heartfelt opinion, about the future prospects of the asset,
and they tell to themselves and others stories (narratives) about those beliefs and opinions. In this paper we
describe what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first ever agent-based modelling platform that allows for
the study of issues in narrative economics. We have created this by integrating and synthesizing research
in two previously separate fields: opinion dynamics (OD), and agent-based computational economics (ACE)
in the form of minimally-intelligent trader-agents operating in accurately modelled financial markets. We
show here for the first time how long-established models in OD and in ACE can be brought together to en-
able the experimental study of issues in narrative economics, and we present initial results from our system.
The program-code for our simulation platform has been released as freely-available open-source software on
GitHub, to enable other researchers to replicate and extend our work.
To be presented at the 13th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (ICAART2021),




In his influential 2017 paper (Shiller, 2017), later expanded into the successful 2019 book Narrative Eco-
nomics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events (Shiller, 2019), Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller
introduced the concept of narrative economics as an overlooked factor in understanding market trends. In brief,
Shiller argues that in many markets the movement and maintenance of prices are driven to a significant extent
by the stories – i.e., the narratives – that market participants tell each other. Shiller draws comparisons between
the spread of narratives and the transmission of infectious diseases, and argues that financial bubbles and crashes
(most notably in cryptocurrency markets) can plausibly be accounted for as primarily driven by the narratives
that traders tell each other, even when those narratives make little sense to outside observers.
The narratives told in and about a market are externalisations, verbalizations, of the participants’ interior
beliefs or opinions. In this paper, we present the first results from a novel synthesis of two previously separate
fields that both rely on agent-based modelling: our work combines practices from minimal-intelligence agent-
based computational economics (ACE) with ideas developed separately in the research field known as opinion
dynamics. We show here for the first time how existing well-known and widely-used ACE models of trader-agents
can be extended so that each trader also holds its own independent opinion, which is our minimal approximation
model of Shiller’s notion that real traders are influenced by the narratives that they hear, read, and tell. In our
work, an individual trader’s opinion may be influenced to varying degrees by the opinions of other traders that
it interacts with; and the trader’s own opinion also directly influences its individual trading activity, i.e. the
sequence of bids and/or offers that it quotes into a single central financial exchange that all traders in our model
interact with. Our model financial exchange is technically a continuous double auction (CDA) market operating
with a limit order book (LOB), which is exactly the structure of existing financial markets such as the New York
Stock Exchange, and all other major national and international financial exchanges.
In keeping with the spirit of minimalism that motivates much ACE work, We show here for the first time how
zero-intelligence (ZI) and minimal-intelligence (MI) trader-agents can be extended so that each trader also holds
its own independent opinion. For consistency with prior work in opinion dynamics (OD) research, we model each
trader’s opinion as a signed scalar real value, e.g. as a number in the continuous range [−1.0,+1.0]: this approach
is long-established in OD research, a field that over its multi-decade history has seen developed a succession of
models introduced to explore and/or account for observable patterns of opinion dynamics in human societies. In
our work we have explored the integration of ZI/MI traders with the following previously-established OD models:
the Bounded Confidence model (Krause, 2000; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002); the Relative Agreement model
(Deffuant et al., 2002; Meadows and Cliff, 2012); and the Relative Disagreement model (Meadows and Cliff,
2013). We refer to these three opinion dynamics models as the BC, RA, and RD models respectively.
The trader-agents that we extend by addition of these OD models are Gode & Sunder’s (1993) Zero Intelli-
gence Constrained (ZIC), and the Near-Zero-Intelligence (NZI) trader agents of (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006)
which minimally extend Gode & Sunder’s ZI approach in such a way that markets populated by NZI traders can
exhibit asset-price bubbles. We refer to the extended agent designs as opinionated agents: we name our opinion-
ated version of ZIC as OZIC, and our opinionated version of NZI as ONZI. For both OZIC and ONZI agents,
the bounds of the probability distribution used to randomly generate a trader’s bid or offer prices is dependent at
least in part on the current value of that agent’s opinion-variable; and that opinion variable can change over time
as a consequence of interactions with other traders in the market, thereby modelling Shiller’s notion of narrative
economics: in our system opinions can drive prices, and prices can alter opinions. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first authors to report on such a system, a synthesis of opinion dynamics and market-trading agents,
and so the primary contribution of this paper is the modelling platform that we describe for the first time here.
The source-code for our system has been placed in the public domain as a freely-available open-source release
on GitHub.1
We evaluate and test the performance of these trading agents, contrasting and comparing the BC, RA, and RD
opinion dynamics models, using as our financial-market simulator BSE, a long-established open-source simulator
of a LOB-based financial exchange for a single asset, and freely available in the public domain since 2012 (Cliff,
2018). This paper summarises (Lomas, 2020), which contains extensive further visualization and discussion of
additional results that are not included here.
In Section 2 we summarise relevant prior academic literature. Section 3 describes near-zero-intelligence
traders in more depth. Section 4 then introduces our innovation, the addition of opinions to trading-agent models,
1 github.com/ken-neth/opinion dynamics BSE.git
giving opinionated traders, and results from simulation studies running on our platform are presented in Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Opinion Dynamics
People are complicated. In particular, how ideas are formed and conveyed to others are difficult to model as there
are numerous factors that could affect the behaviour of individuals. Nevertheless we can say, with some degree
of certainty, that people hold opinions and these opinions are changed by interacting with the world. Taking this
a step further, people communicate and at some point during or after the communication their opinions may alter
as a consequence. Given a sufficiently large population we can design models for how their opinions will change
over time, i.e. models of the system’s opinion dynamics (OD). Of course these models make clear assumptions
and may not fully encapsulate the inner workings of a person but can nevertheless be useful in understanding
problems relying on the opinions of large populations.
One early OD model is given in (DeGroot, 1974). In this model, a group of experts have different opinions
on a subject and want to reach a consensus. The experts decide on a format of structured debate where each
individual expert has a turn to express their opinion, taking the form of a real number, and at the end every
expert updates their own individual opinion, using a fixed weight. The experts continue to take turns sharing
their opinions until a consensus is reached. (DeGroot, 1974) proves that they will always reach a consensus given
positive weights.
A number of later works have analysed the DeGroot model. In (Chatterjee and Seneta, 1977) the DeGroot
model’s treatment of the consensus problem is related to the ergodicity problem in probability theory, which
concerns stochastic state spaces where from a given state all possible states are reachable and hence backwards
traversal of the state space is difficult.
The DeGroot model was subsequently analysed by (Friedkin, 1999), who described experiments to understand
how the model’s mean opinions change over time. Choice-shifts are shown by the difference between the final
group mean opinion and their initial mean opinion. These experiments showed how individuals in the population
could have greater influence on the overall consensus, and Friedkin argued that choice shifts are an inherent
problem in discussions of issues where influence is not balanced.
2.1.1 Bounded Confidence
A variation on the DeGroot model was described in (Krause, 2000) and named the Bounded Confidence (BC)
model. In this, all agents in a fixed-size population hold an opinion that is represented as a real number. The
agents share their opinions and only update their opinions if they are closer than a given deviation threshold. The
reasoning for this is that humans are less likely to have their opinions swayed by someone whose opinion heavily
deviates from their own. A formal specification of the BC model is given in (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002) and
summarised as follows: given a population of size n, xi(t) represents the opinion of expert i at time t. This is
updated by:
xi(t +1) = ai1x1(t)+ai2x2(t)+ ...+ainxn(t),
where ai j is the confidence factor between experts i and j. Crucially the confidence factor between two experts
can be zero if the difference in their opinions are too great. Since at each time step opinions change, it is possible
that at a much later time step two agents that initially held too-distant opinions can come to be within a sufficiently
close range to start to agree.
At the beginning of a simulation, all opinions should be distributed over [−1,+1]⊂ R , with any individuals
holding opinions less than or greater than a certain extreme value parameter regarded as extremists. As time
progresses, experts whose opinions deviate by less than the deviation threshold move closer together according
to a confidence factor. The opinions of the experts will converge until the simulation reaches a stable state with
do further changes.
2.1.2 Relative Agreement
Another well-known Opinion Dynamics model, the Relative Agreement (RA) model was proposed by (Deffuant
et al., 2000). In the RA model experts hold opinions, that are each represented as a real number, but with
the difference that they also hold an uncertainty, which acts like a range around their opinion. The experts
communicate and provided the overlap of their uncertainties exceeds the expert’s individual uncertainty then they
update their opinion and uncertainty by a weight parameter and a Relative Agreement value.
Figure 1: Overlap hi j for experts i and j with opinions Xi and X j and uncertainties ui and u j respectively
According to the RA model definition in the Deffuant et al. 2000 paper, opinions are updated as follows: a
pair of experts i and j are chosen at random from the population of experts. Firstly, calculate the overlap hi j, as
illustrated in Figure 1,
hi j = min(xi +ui,x j +u j)−max(xi−ui,x j−u j),
where xi is the real number representation of the opinion of expert i, and ui is the uncertainty of expert i in their
own opinion. Then, subtract the size of the non-overlapping part 2ui− hi j so the total agreement of the two
experts is given by:
hi j− (2ui−hi j) = 2(hi j−ui),
and so the RA between i and j is given by:
RAi j = 2(hi j−ui)/2ui = (hi j/ui)−1
Then if hi j > ui, the update is given by:
x j := x j +µRAi j(xi− x j)
u j := u j +µRAi j(ui−u j)
where µ is a constant parameter for convergence, similar to the confidence factor in the BC model. (Deffuant
et al., 2000) show that the RA model converges to an average of n = w/2u opinions as opposed to the BC model
that converges to n = floor(w/2u) opinions.
Extremists were added by (Deffuant et al., 2002), which also describes three modes of convergence that occur
with the RA model: central convergence; bipolar convergence; and single-extreme convergence. As with BC, at
the beginning of an RA simulation all opinions are randomly distributed over [−1,+1]⊂R . Central convergence
appears as all of the opinions converge towards a stable single central value, around zero. In the case where the
opinions converge towards two separate values and reach a stable state, we have bipolar convergence. When all
opinions converge towards an extreme value and reach a stable state, exceeding a given extreme parameter, we
have single-extreme convergence. In a later paper (Deffuant, 2006), an asymmetric influence rule is described
where agents that are more convinced of their own opinion exert greater influence upon others.
In (Deffuant et al., 2002) a metric is used to measure the influence of extremists in a population called the y
metric. The y metric, or indicator, is given by the formula:
y = p2++ p
2
−,
where p+ denotes the proportion of experts that were initially moderate but held a positive extreme opinion by the
end of the simulation, and p− denotes the proportion of experts that were initially moderate but held a negative
extreme opinion by the end of the simulation. Deffuant et al. use the y metric as an indicator of convergence
type, i.e. central convergence at y = 0, bipolar convergence at y = 0.5, and single extreme convergence at y = 1.
2.1.3 Relative Disagreement
The RA model has been shown to successfully simulate useful convergences in populations with extremists
initialized. A more recent model, introduced in (Meadows and Cliff, 2013), and called the Relative Disagreement
(RD) model improves on the RA model by introducing probability λ of an update occurring and the idea of
reactance. In (Meadows and Cliff, 2013) the RD model was shown to achieve the same opinion convergences as
the RA model without the need for initialising the population with extremists.
Reactance is the motivation to disagree with an opinion. In psychology it has been rationalised as a desire to
exercise freedom when that freedom is under threat (Steindl et al., 2015). It is an important part of how people
behave and how they come to hold certain opinions. The RD model incorporates the idea of reactance by having
individuals’ opinions diverge when they disagree to enough of a degree. In contrast to hi j in RA, gi j is the non
overlapping distance calculated by:
gi j = max(xi−ui,x j−u j)−min(xi +ui,x j +u j)
Figure 2: Illustration of non overlapping distance gi j for experts i and j with opinions Xi and X j and uncertainties ui and u j
respectively
Subtract the extent of the overlap 2ui−gi j to give the total disagreement:
gi j− (2ui−gi j) = 2(gi j−ui)
The RD between i and j is given by:
RDi j = 2(gi j−ui)/2ui = (gi j/ui)−1
If gi j > ui, update the opinions and uncertainties with probability λ, where λ is a parameter.
x j := x j +µRDi j(xi− x j)
u j := u j +µRDi j(ui−u j)
2.2 Markets and Traders
The famous 18th-Century Scottish economist Adam Smith included a description of what he called The Invisible
Hand in his landmark book (Smith, 1759); Smith used the term to embody the unintended positive effects of
selfish behaviour in a market. This idea forms the basis for allocative efficiency, sometimes thought as the
“fairness” of a market. Where utility is the measure of the usefulness a person gets from a product, the allocative
efficiency of a market is the total utility gained from trade, expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible
utility to be gained.
Understanding the details of how selfish interactions among competitive traders in a market can give rise to
desirable outcomes, such as efficient allocation of scarce resources between producers and consumers, has been
a desire of economists ever since Adam Smith. A major step forward was taken by American economist Vernon
Smith who in the late 1950s started a program of experimental studies of human traders interacting in markets
under repeatable laboratory conditions – a field that became known as experimental economics, the founding and
growth of which resulted in Vernon Smith being awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. Much of Smith’s
experimental work studied the dynamics of markets in which human traders, either buyers announcing bid-prices
or sellers announcing ask-prices, interacted with one another via a market mechanism known as the continuous
double auction (CDA) which is the basis of almost all of the world’s major financial markets. In a CDA a buyer
can announce a bid at any time and a seller can announce an offer at any time, and any buyer is free to accept an
ask at any time while any seller is free to accept a bid at any time.
In establishing experimental economics research, Vernon Smith had devised experimental CDA auctions for
teaching purposes and later as a tool to observe how traders in a market act according to different specified con-
ditions (Smith, 1962). Vernon Smith and his fellow experimental economists focused entirely on the interactions
among human traders in their market laboratories but in 1993, inspired by Vernon Smith’s work, the economists
Gode & Sunder devised experiments to compare the allocative efficiency of minimally-simple automated trading
systems against human traders. Gode & Sunder’s automated traders we so simple that they were, entirely justifi-
ably, referred to as zero-intelligence (ZI) traders. Most notably, in (Gode and Sunder, 1993) the authors describe
the design of a ZI trader known as ZIC (for ZI-Constrained) which generated random bid or ask prices, subject
to the single budget constraint that the prices generated should not lead to loss-making deals: ZIC is constrained
by a limit price and so draws its bid quote price from a uniform random distribution below the limit price, and its
ask quote price from a uniform random distribution above the limit price.
To everyone’s surprise the allocative efficiency scores of CDA markets populated by ZIC traders was demon-
strated to be statistically indistinguishable from those of comparable CDA markets populated by human traders.
Gode & Sunder’s result indicated to many people that the high intelligence of human traders was irrelevant
within the context of a CDA-based market, and a research field formed, with various authors publishing details
of automated trading systems that refined and extended the ZI approach.
Often these early automated traders involved some means of making the trader adaptive, so that it could
adjust its response to changing market conditions. As adaptivity to the environment is seen by some as a minimal
signifier of intelligence, adaptive ZI-style automated trading agents became known as minimal-intelligence (MI)
traders.
Numerous variations on ZI/MI traders have been proposed to test the limits of their trading performance and
to provide more human-like trader to test new trading strategies against. A notable work, which extended a MI
trading strategy to enable the study of asset price bubbles and crashes, is (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006), discussed
in more detail below.
The primary contribution of this paper is to combine the Opinion Dynamics models with ZI/MI automated
traders, creating a new class of automated trading strategies: ones that are still zero- or minimal- intelligence, but
which also hold opinions.
In the 27 years since Gode and Sunder published their seminal 1993 paper on ZIC, the field of agent-based
computational economics (ACE) has grown and matured. For reviews of work in this field, see (Chen, 2018;
Hommes, C. and LeBaron, B., 2018). ACE is a subset of research in agent-based modelling (ABM), which uses
computational models of interacting agents to study various phenomena in the natural and social sciences: see
(Cooks and Heppenstall, 2011) for more details.
2.3 The BSE Financial Exchange
We used the BSE open-source simulator of a contemporary financial exchange populated with a number of
automated trading systems. The BSE project is open source and publicly available on Github, at: https:
//github.com/davecliff/BristolStockExchange (Cliff, 2018).
BSE is a simulated CDA-based financial market, which is populated by a user-specifiable configuration of
various automated-trader systems; it includes a number of predefined classes of automated trader each with
unique trading strategies.
BSE’s implementation of a CDA, like real-world financial exchanges, requires buyers and sellers to submit
bid and ask prices simultaneously and continuously onto an exchange mechanism that publishes the orders to a
Limit Order Book, (LOB), each order (each bid or ask) specifies a price and a quantity. A transaction will go
through when a buyer’s bid price and a seller’s ask price are the same or ’cross’, i.e. if a buyer’s bid exceeds
a seller’s ask, or a seller’s ask is less than a buyer’s bid. When the transaction is complete, the orders have
been filled hence they are removed from the LOB. On a Limit Order Book (LOB), the bids and asks are stacked
separately on ordered lists each sorted from best to worst: the best bid is the highest-priced one and the remaining
bids are listed in decreasing-price order below it; the best ask is the lowest-priced one and the remaining asks are
listed in ascending-price-order below it.
BSE comes with several types of ZI/MI automated traders built-in, including Gode & Sunder’s ZIC, and also
Vytelingum’s AA trader (Vytelingum, 2006) which was demonstrated by (De Luca and Cliff, 2011) to outpefrom
human traders, so an experimental market can readily be set up and populated with some number of traders of
each type. However BSE does not include the Near-Zero Intelligence (NZI) trader-type introduced by (Duffy and
Utku Ünver, 2006), so we created our own implementation of that and added it to BSE: the source-code for that
implementation is available in our GitHub repository, the location of which was given in the footnote in Section
1. In the next section we describe NZI traders in more detail.
3 Near-Zero-Intelligence Traders
In (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006), NZI traders are defined to mimic the behaviour of traders in markets where
asset prices bubble and crash, i.e. where the price of a tradeable asset rises quickly and falls precipitously. As
the name implies, NZI traders are similar to Gode and Sunder’s ZI traders but have some added features. The
following is a summary of key aspects of NZI traders.
3.1 The Weak Foresight Assumption
Firstly, Duffy and nver define the weak foresight assumption (WFA) which gives the traders knowledge that the
trading session is coming to an end. This involves two variables: D̄Tt and πt , both of which are explained further
below.
A trading period is defined as 240 seconds where at the end of a trading period the traders earn a dividend
per unit of the asset they own. The dividend amount is a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution with








At the start of each simulation of T trading periods, a trader i has a balance of xi and owns a number yi of
units of the tradeable asset. Before the first trading period, t = 1, we have the equation:
xi + D̄T1 yi = c
where c is a constant for all i.
During the simulation of the market sessions, D̄Tt decreases as t → T . It represents the fundamental market
price or the default value of the asset at period t which earns zero profit. It is calculated by the equation:
D̄Tt = d̄(T − t +1)+ D̄TT+1
D̄Tt is a value that decreases by d̄ each trading period t, this makes up the first part of the WFA.
The second part of the WFA is πt , the probability of a trader being a buyer in trading period t. It is given by
the equation:
πt = max{0.5−ϕt,0}
where ϕ ∈ [0,0.5/T ). Since 0≤ ϕ < 0.5T then 0 < πt ≤ 0.5, and as t→ T , the probability of a trader being a buyer
decreases over time; therefore traders are less likely to buy as time goes by. The combination of a reduction in
tendency to buy, caused by πt , and a decrease in the default value of the asset, D̄Tt , results in traders having a
“weak” awareness of the future hence, the name “weak foresight assumption”.
3.2 The Loose Budget Constraint
In (Gode and Sunder, 1993), their ZIC trader has a no loss constraint. That constraint on ZIC traders forces them
to buy and sell at prices bounded by the intrinsic value, and transacting at that price would not result in asset price
inflation.
In contrast to Gode and Sunder’s work, (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006) propose a “loose” budget constraint:
if trader i is a seller and has an asset, submit an ask price; and if trader i is a buyer and has sufficient cash balance,
submit a bid price:
if trader i is a seller and trader i has an asset then
submit ask
else if trader i is a buyer then
submit min(balance, bid)
end if
3.3 The “Anchoring Effect”
Another departure from (Gode and Sunder, 1993) is that Duffy & nver’s NZI traders are not entirely zero-
intelligence. In fact they have knowledge of the mean transaction price from the previous trading period, denoted
p̄t−1, which is used to calculate the trader’s initial quote price in a trading period – thus the trader’s quote price is
to some extent “anchored” by the previous period’s prices. In the first session, p̄t−1 = 0, and the traders submit
low quote prices.
3.4 Formal Specification
Simulations involve T market periods or sessions, t ∈ [1,T ], and within each iteration of each market session a
trader i is chosen to submit an order in sequence S, s ∈ S. The uniform random variable uit,s is calculated using
D̄Tt via:
uit,s ∈ [εt , ε̄t ]
where εt = 0, ε̄t = kD̄
T
t and k > 0 is a parameter. The upper bound of u
i
t,s, ε̄t , will decrease over time since D̄
T
t








If a trader is a seller then offer the ask price ait,s,
ait,s = (1−α)uit,s +αP̄t−1,
where α ∈ (0,1) is a constant parameter. Using the loose budget constraint so a buyer can only offer as much
money as they possess, if a trader is a buyer then offer the bid price bit,s,
bit,s = min{(1−α)uit,s +αP̄t−1,xit,s}
The combination of a decreasing D̄Tt value and an anchoring to the mean transaction price of the previous
trading period P̄t−1 results in a humped shape pattern in the transaction history. This hump is the model’s en-
dogenous rise in price, i.e. the ‘bubble’, followed by a fall or ‘crash’. The mean transaction price per trading
period increases initially due to the high D̄Tt value which increases the bid and ask prices above the previous
mean transaction price P̄t−1. Eventually as the value of D̄Tt decreases, the mean transaction price levels out closer
to αP̄t−1 which is less than or equal to P̄t−1.
4 Opinionated Traders
We introduce a new variation on the ZIC trader model, from (Gode and Sunder, 1993), called the Opinionated-
ZIC (i.e., OZIC) trader, that submits quote-prices affected by its opinion.
The BSE simulator (Cliff, 2018) contains an implementation of the ZIC trader, which has knowledge of the
Limit Order Book (LOB), it sets its minimum quote price to the worst bid on the LOB, its maximum quote price
to the best ask price on the LOB, and its limit price to that specified by the customer order currently being worked
on. If the ZIC trader is a buyer then it submits orders with a quote price generated from a random draw between
the minimum quote price and the limit price. Otherwise, if the ZIC trader is a seller then it submits orders with
a quote price generated from a random draw between the limit price and the maximum quote price. The quote
price distribution for ZIC traders are illustrated in Figure 4a, with the buyers’ quote price distribution on the left
and the sellers’ quote price distribution on the right.
The Opinionated Zero-Intelligence-Constrained (OZIC) trader model submits quote prices that vary accord-
ing to its opinion. If the OZIC trader is a buyer and its opinion is negative then it submits a low bid, and if its
Figure 3: Comparison of mean transaction price path in the simulations and actual data from (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006)
opinion is positive then it submits a bid that is higher but still capped at its limit price. On the other hand if the
OZIC trader is a seller and its opinion is negative then it submits a low ask, and if its opinion is positive then
it submits a high ask. This models the idea that traders will submit quote prices close to what they believe the
actual value of the stock to be, and if a traders holds a positive opinion of the stock they would believe the value
of the stock to be greater than a trader holding a negative opinion of the stock.
As illustrated in Figure 4b, the quote price range for OZIC buyers are between the minimum price and their
opinionated limit, and the quote price range for OZIC sellers are between their opinionated limit and the maxi-
mum price.
If the OZIC trader i is a buyer then calculate the opinionated limit OLi by:




where L is the limit price, M is the minimum price, and xi is the opinion of OZIC trader i: this gives f (−1) = M;
f (0) = L+M2 : and f (1) = L. Then generate a bid quote price as a random draw from the interval [M,OLi].
If the OZIC trader i is a seller then calculate the opinionated limit OLi by:
OLi = f ′(x) =
L(1− xi)+ M̄(1+ xi)
2
,
where L is the limit price, M̄ is the maximum price, and xi is the opinion of OZIC trader i: this gives f ′(−1) = L;
f ′(0) = L+M̄2 ; and f (1) = (̄M). Then bid quote prices are generated as a random draw from the interval [OLi,M̄].
4.1 Opinionated NZI Traders
We also introduce here an Opinionated Near-Zero-Intelligence (ONZI) trader based on the near-zero-intelligence
(NZI) trader model of (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006). The ONZI trader model offers the possibility of price
bubbles dependent on the prevailing opinions of the population, i.e. if the opinions are mostly positive then the
bubble should be greater than if the opinions were mostly negative.
(a) Quote price range of ZIC traders
(b) Quote price range of OZIC traders
Figure 4: Diagrams of quote price range for Gode & Sunder’s Zero Intelligence Constrained (ZIC) Traders in 4a and for our
Opinionated-ZIC (OZIC) Traders in 4b. The shaded region represents the uniform distribution that the traders’ quote prices
are drawn from.
4.2 Recreating NZI trader model
Duffy & Utku nver’s NZI trader model uses a random component uit,s, given by u
i
t,s ∈ [0,kD̄Tt ], where i is the
index of the trader, t is the current trading period out of T periods, s is the order of the trader in the sequence that
the traders submit orders, k is a constant parameter, and D̄Tt is the default value of the asset. The ask price a
i
t,s is
calculated using uit,s as described in Section 3.
In (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006), optimal parameter values were calibrated to best match their simulated
data with the data collected from experiments with human traders. The values are as follows: k∗ = 4.0846,
α∗ = 0.8480, φ∗ = 0.01674, and S∗ = 5. We use the optimised parameter values k∗ and α∗ hereafter, however
we have not used φ∗ because in our work the buyers and sellers do not change specification and we have not
used S∗ as small values of S do not show opinion convergences in large populations very well. The ask and bid
price of traders are calculated in such a way that they require the default value D̄Tt of the asset and the mean
transaction price of the previous trading period P̄t−1. To get the default value of D̄Tt for each trading period t, the
expected dividend amount d̄ is calculated by the average of dividends [0,1,2,3] which is 1.5 and the final value
is set D̄TT+1 = 40. These values form a similar gradient for D̄
T
t over time to that shown in (Duffy and Utku Ünver,
2006).
4.3 Opinionated Limit
We created an opinionated limit to integrate trader opinions with the NZI strategies. Similarly to the opinionated
limit calculation in our OZIC trader model, the opinionated limit of the ONZI trader model can be calculated
from between αP̄t−1 and (1−α)kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1, as shown in Figure 5a, because the maximum uit,s value is kD̄Tt . So
for an ONZI trader i, with opinion xi, the opinionated limit OLi is calculated by:
OLi =
(1−α)(kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1)(1+ xi)+(αP̄t−1)(1− xi)
2
This form is closest to that of OZIC traders but is easier to read when expressed in terms of the opinionated
uncertainty OU it,s, based on the definition of u
i
t,s, which is given by:






Figure 5: Diagram of quote price range for Opinionated near-zero-intelligence (ONZI) Traders in 5a and an illustration of the
possible range for the mean transaction price P̄t of trading period t in relation to the previous mean transaction price P̄t−1 in
5b.
Then the quote price ait,s is calculated by:
ait,s = (1−α)OU it,s +αP̄t−1
The effect of the opinionated uncertainty uit,s is illustrated in Figure 5b, where the value of P̄t is the mean
transaction price for trading period t. During trading period t, every trader will submit quotes between αP̄t−1 and
(1−α)kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1 so if there are n transactions that take place at the maximum (1−α)kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1 then the




∑((1−α)kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1) = (1−α)kD̄Tt +αP̄t−1





The shaded region in Figure 5b represents the range that P̄t can be in, i.e. between αP̄t−1 and (1−α)kD̄Tt +
αP̄t−1. The value of D̄Tt will decrease hence the range for P̄t decreases however will roughly remain centered.
In contrast, a population of ONZI traders will submit high quote prices, close to the maximum, when they hold




The more useful results are in the extreme cases of opinion distribution, i.e. when all the traders hold extremely
positive opinions or negative opinions. In Figure 6, we have shown the effects of extremely positive opinion
distribution on the transaction history which is quite high, whereas for an extremely negative opinion distribution
the transaction history shows very low prices. The results use the RA model with pe = 0.5 and w = 0.5, and a
function that specifies the distribution of extremists.
In Figure 7, we have plotted the transaction histories of OZIC traders with extremely positive opinions, in
orange, and extremely negative opinions, in green. When compared this way it is clear that the traders with
extremely positive opinions trade at much higher prices than traders with extremely negative opinions.
5.1.2 Extreme Opinion Shift
We initialise a given proportion of extremists to be extremely positive or negative initially and switch them to the
polar opposite opinion half way through the duration of the simulation. Figure 8 shows the results for a population
of 100 OZIC buyers and 100 OZIC sellers using the RA model with proportion of extremists pe= 0.5, confidence
factor µ = 0.5, and uncertainty in the range [0.2,2.0].
The results show a clear change in mean transaction price in relation to opinion distribution. For a positive
to negative opinion shift, the traders start selling and buying at high prices and after t = 1350 drastically shift to
lower prices. Similarly for a negative to positive opinion shift, the traders begin trading at low prices and after
t = 1350 trade at higher prices.
5.2 ONZI Trader Results
5.2.1 Baseline Results
The same rationality for testing the extreme opinion distributions for ONZI traders applies to testing ONZI
traders. With extremely positive opinions, the shape of the transaction history peaks higher and has a greater
initial gradient than that of ONZI traders with extremely negative opinions. ONZI traders with extremely negative
opinions show a shorter hump shaped pattern than the ONZI traders with extremely positive opinions.
In Figures 10 and 11, inspired by a graph in (Duffy and Utku Ünver, 2006), we have plotted the transaction
histories of the ONZI trader, in orange, against an ordinary near-zero-intelligence (NZI) trader’s results, in green.
We have also plotted D̄T over time and 1/2κD̄T over time to illustrate the effect it has on the transaction price
over time. The average transaction price per trading period is also shown to encapsulate the overall behaviour of
the market trends, in red. The simulated data for NZI traders, in green, tapers off and does not crash because we
are not using a decreasing proportion of buyers in the population.
Figure 6: OZIC traders with extreme opinions. Upper row of plots is for traders with extremely positive opinions; lower
row is for traders with extremeley negative opinons. The plot at far left shows the convergence of opinion values in the
population over time, in the 2D style used by (Deffuant et al., 2002) among others – the population converges to a situation
where all traders hold one of three opinions; the two central plots display the same opinion-distribution data as 3D plots
(heatmap-colored on the left; uncoloured on the right), which gives a better indication of the number of traders that hold each
converged-upon opinion. The dark-background plot at far right in each row os the transaction-price time series from this
experiment.
The transaction price data for ONZI traders with extremely positive opinions is very close to the simulated
transaction history of near-zero-intelligence traders, as shown in Figure 10. On the other hand, the transaction
price data for ONZI traders with extremely negative opinions is much lower than the simulated transaction history
of near-zero-intelligence traders, as shown in Figure 11.
5.2.2 Extreme Opinion Shift
Figure 12 shows ONZI traders with extremely positive opinions until half way through the simulation, i.e. t =
1350, when the opinions shift to extremely negative, and vice versa. The opinion dynamics model used is RA with
confidence factor µ = 0.5 and proportion of extremists pe = 0.5 for both initializations of extremists. Similarly to
the results in Figures 13 and 14, we have plotted the transaction histories of ONZI traders with drastically shifting
opinion distributions against the ordinary NZI traders, the default value D̄T , the expected uncertainty 1/2κD̄T ,
and the mean transaction price per trading period. The mean transaction price per trading period, in red, is a
useful indicator of the trends generated from the opinion distribution, as the average transaction price over time
increases and decreases according to positive and negative opinions respectively.
Figure 7: Comparison of OZIC trader transaction histories with extremely negative and positive opinions
Figure 8: OZIC traders with extreme shifts in opinion at the start of Period 6; format as for Figure 6.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have described what we believe to be the first ever system that integrates ideas from opinion
dynamics into well-established trader-agent models, and in doing so we have created the first platform for the
experimental exploration of agent-based models of narrative economics. In his seminal work on narrative eco-
nomics, Nobel-Laureate Robert Shiller argues for a program of empirical research, gathering data on the stories,
the narratives, that humans tell each other about economic affairs, which shape and change their opinions about
future economic events, and where those opinions are themselves also significant factors in the dynamics of
economic affairs. Our work opens up an experimental approach that is complementary to the one proposed by
Shiller: using our platform, experimentalists can now also run agent-based simulations to better understand the
dynamic interplay between opinions, expressions of those opinions, and subsequent economic outcomes.
Figure 9: ONZI trader transaction histories with extreme positive and negative opinions; format as for Figure 6.
Figure 10: ONZI trader transaction history with extremely positive opinions; compared to the original NZI results shown in
Figure 3. Yellow lines show transaction history of traders with extreme positive opinions; green lines are baseline comparison;
red line shows mean transaction price.
Figure 11: ONZI trader transaction history with extremely negative opinions; compared to the original NZI results as shown
in Figure 3. Color-coding of lines is as for Figure 10.
Figure 12: ONZI extreme opinion shifts; format as for Figure 6.
Figure 13: ONZI traders with extremely positive opinions drastically shifting to negative opinions at the start of Period 6.
Color-coding of lines is as for Figure 10.
Figure 14: ONZI traders with extremely negative opinions drastically shifting to positive opinions at the start of Period 6.
Color-coding of lines is as for Figure 10.
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